Kokubun Paper

East Asian Security and Japan-US-China Relations

Ryosei Kokubun (Professor, Keio University)

Introduction

The final year of the twentieth century has arrived. Volumes of books and articles attempting to describe the world of the next one inundate us. However, it is not as if the onset of a new century will suddenly trigger sweeping changes. Just as legacies--both positive and negative--spilled over from the nineteenth into the twentieth century, problems and advantages of our time will continue on into the next century. Consider the nation-state. Firmly established in Europe by the end of the nineteenth century, the institution of nation-states was spreading to other areas of the world as the twentieth century began. But even now, at the end of that century, functional nation-states remain limited in scope as witnessed by outbreaks of ethnic conflict. The establishment of nation-states everywhere remains unfinished business that must be carried over into the next century.

At the same time, a new challenge does confront our times--globalism. Indeed, globalism directly challenges the nation-state itself, as the spread of the market economy, democracy, and information across national borders pervades every corner of the globe. On the brink of the twenty-first century, indications suggest a coming world defined by the struggle between the inward-oriented nation-state and outward-oriented globalism.

East Asia is no exception. Once the Asian currency crisis of 1997 visited economic confusion on every region of East Asia, its countries were compelled to turn all their energy and attention to the task of rebuilding their nations. In the event, each country underwent fluctuations in its political system of some sort. For instance, turmoil in Indonesia eventually led to the realization of an independent East Timor. Numerous challenges stretch ahead accompanying East Timor's transition, not least of which being fundamental nation-building itself.

Even if we turn our attention to those countries nearer to us, we see flux. By transforming its economy to a market-orientation, China accomplished radical growth, but is now coming under the threat of the wave of recession partly due to the Asian economic crisis. At the same time, China, burning with a tenacious pursuit of perfecting its nation-state, welcomed a reverted Macau in December 1999. Its greatest unfulfilled ambition, Taiwan, remains elusive. Korea, despite being completely tossed on the rough seas of the Asian economic crisis, somehow manages to be revitalizing its economy. The experience, however, has begun to exert a subtle influence on its policies. Specifically, South Korea indicates it will revamp its program for reunification with the North, recasting ultimate unification as a more long-term objective.

Throughout this overall process, America's role is a decidedly important factor. This fall brings a presidential election. Whether America chooses a Republican or Democrat administration, it cannot forfeit its interest in the region. No matter how often the isolationist tradition rears its head, a complete and true withdrawal cannot be imagined, considering the tremendous vital political, security and economic interests the US has in the region. When pressed, all the nations in East Asia today would lean strongly towards a supportive stance on the issue of continued US presence, though certainly subtle differences mark the individual nation's positions.

The role of the world's number two economy, Japan, also looms large. In spite of the recession, its economic interdependence deepens considerably with all the countries in East Asia, and Japan continues to rank as the largest contributor nation to ODA. Moreover, strengthening of its alliance with the US should cause an expansion of Japan's political role in the region. The recently agreed upon revised US-Japan security guidelines symbolize this. But, with the ongoing effort to restructure domestic industries, worsening government financial deficit, and an aging society, doubts naturally arise concerning whether Japan's national strength can permit continued maintenance of growing international contributions.

Nonetheless, in terms of the course of security relations in East Asia, this stage of the end of the twentieth century bears significance. To narrow down the discussion, then undoubtedly the key nations to discuss include America, China and Japan. We choose them not simply from the perspective of an international relations view of key powers, but also considering historical and current realities. Thus, as we live in the final stage of the twentieth century, I would like to revisit the trilateral relations among Japan, China, and the US from the viewpoint of East Asian security.(1) Before closing, I would like to add some final remarks on the increasing importance to Japan of strengthening its cooperative ties with both China and Korea.

1. Japan, the US and China in the Twentieth Century

1) A Historical View of Japan, the US and China

A historical review of twentieth century international relations in the Asia Pacific region reaffirms the significance of trilateral relations among Japan, the US and China in the regional structure and order.

About one hundred years ago, American Secretary of State John Hay announced the so-called Open Door policy. This declaration exemplified America's position as a latecomer to the community of global powers, lagging behind European powers with already established interests facilitating access to the Chinese market. It stated that "equality of opportunity" should define relations with China. America's Open Door policy engendered deep contradictions with Japan, a rising power that had recently defeated the Qing Dynasty in a war and was thus beginning to make renewed demands for concessions from China. Further, Japan invaded China in the 1930's, extending its demands beyond Manchuria to the entirety of China's mainland. Military expansionism did not stop with China, but spread as far as the South Pacific and South East Asia, ultimately bringing Japan into direct conflict with America. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan plunged into an all-out war in the Pacific. Only with the total defeat of Japan in August 1945 did the war finally end. In this way, Japan-US-China relations the first half of the twentieth century suggest a two-against-one structure, with China and America united in their opposition to the Japanese invasion.

In 1949, Chinese established Communist rule on the mainland. Against the backdrop of the emerging cold war structure, this new People's Republic of China concluded an alliance relationship with the Soviet Union. Japan, for its part, signed a bilateral security treaty to enter into an alliance with the United States. America at the time ascribed to a "containment policy" against Communism; in Asia this equated, in essence, to opposition to China. This general state of affairs continued until 1971-1972, and the sudden shock of US-Chinese reconciliation. In this way, Japan-US-China relations the third quarter of the twentieth century can also be outlined as a two-against-one structure, this time with U.S. and Japan opposing China.

After 1972, China-US relations dramatically improved despite existing under the cold war structure. Enabling this strategic shift was the shared perception of the utility of a "marriage of convenience" between the two powers. America needed to use the so-called China card in its opposition to the Soviet Union; China similarly integrated its US ties into its deepening opposition to the Soviet Union. This Sino-US rapprochement served as the decisive turning point in the establishment of Japan-China diplomatic relations. Specifically, China finally granted heretofore-withheld acquiescence on the US-Japan Security Treaty, a key prerequisite for normalization. As China worked towards normalization, it clarified its intention on this issue for the Japanese government stating, "Once normalized ties are restored, the US-Japan security treaty no longer has any efficacy towards China."(2) Without this tacit acceptance, Japan would not have been able to move towards normalization. This Chinese tolerance of the US-Japan Security Treaty of course derived from its confrontation with the Soviet Union. This formulation of US-Japan-China relations into a combined opposition to the Soviet Union (three-against-outsider) endured until Sino-Soviet normalization in 1989, and the end of the cold war.

2) Japan-US-China Relations and the "China Factor" since the end of the Cold War

Since entering the 1990's, Japan-US-China relations reached a new stage. However, the overarching structure of this new relationship remains elusive. During and since the '90's, China continues to rise as an important focus for international relations within the Asian-Pacific region. In 1990, the Soviet Communists abandoned one-party dictatorship and by 1991 the Soviet Union itself completely disintegrated. Events culminated with democratization in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In contrast, China descended into international isolation following its handling of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, and defensively attacked what it called attempts at heping yanbian(peaceful evolution). With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the world inevitable turned its attention to the actions of the socialist power of China.

In this environment, Deng Xiaoping pursued policies to revive China in 1992. To inaugurate this movement, Deng gave a series of speeches to accompany his "southern tour" of China that further institutionalized his concept of the socialist market economy. This formula envisions advances towards the goal of reform and opening through the introduction of a market economy, conducted under the premise of continuing socialism. As a result of this turn of policy, not only did China redirect its economy onto the path of growth, but also the increasingly isolated China re-emerged on the international stage and China even subdued its criticisms of the dreaded "peaceful evolution."

In due time however, due to economic revival, China experienced exceedingly sudden economic growth. Disputes surfaced over the Spratly Islands, a trend towards quickly escalating defense expenditures emerged, and a crisis erupted across the Taiwan Strait. As a result, the "China threat" argument came to the fore in Southeast Asia, the US and Japan for a period. But in 1997, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin visited America and in 1998, US President Clinton reciprocated with a state visit to China. Through these events, Sino-US relations shifted significantly towards cooperative relations, as symbolized by the buzzword "strategic partnership" replacing the fading "China threat" argument. Then, arguments that the twenty-first century will usher in "the era of China and the US" intensified while Japan, fueled by the deepening economic recession, suffered from a pervading sense of gloom, and lamented "Japan passing."

But this state of affairs did not endure for very long either. Since late 1998, indications of a total change in dynamics once again emerge. China faces tough predicaments, both at home and in the international arena. Tasting the effects of the Asian currency crisis, China witnesses the dampening of its once vigorous economic growth. Stagnant domestic demand, surplus of supplies, and growing unemployment move the economy towards deflation and depression. Internationally, China was engaged in a battle with the US over Chinese accession to the WTO, and the ideological divide between them recurred and worsened over NATO bombings of Kosovo in Yugoslavia. Amidst all this, the tragic incident occurred when the US military mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Following that, the release of the Cox report, which surfaced accusations of Chinese military spying in America, as well as the public pronouncement by Taiwan's President Lee Tenghui of his "special state-to-state" theory initiated further disputes between China and the United States. Sino-US ties once again thoroughly spiraled downward, and the once-touted "strategic partnership" quickly devolved into a crisis. Nonetheless, in November 1999 both sides negotiated a Chinese accession to the WTO, providing the bilateral relationship with a respite.

Sino-Japanese relations also fluctuated. The communication gap between China and Japan apparent during Jiang Zemin's fall 1998 visit to Japan symbolizes this.(3) Certainly notable "firsts" resulted from the visit, including use of the term shinryaku, which translates as "invasion," to describe Japan's past actions, and China's public expression of appreciation for Japanese economic assistance. But throughout the visit, the central issue remained the problems of history, specifically concerning whether or not Japan would insert owabi or "apology" into the statement. As these two nations head into the twenty-first century, clearly the problem of history remains insufficiently resolved; even this state visit left a bitter taste and negative impression with both sides. Around this time, mutual images between China and Japan bottomed out, which implies that the negative impact of this visit will not soon be simply erased.

Despite these contrary trends, the "China threat" argument has not necessarily returned to its original prevalence in mainstream discussion. Nonetheless, China remains the focal point of debate as the Asia Pacific region heads to the twenty-first century. Essentially, the backdrop for recurring controversies among Japan, the US and China is the dynamic of the rise of China, a supremely unique and enormous nation-state, in post-cold war Asia. Thus Japan and America must consider the very real need to facilitate cooperative ties with China. US policy vacillates between "containment" and "engagement" with shifts in domestic politics. Japan experiences emotional swings between ikei or "reverence" and iwakan or "a sense of incompatibility," even as its policy has remained consistent, even during Japan's handling of the Tiananmen Incident. The policy follows a line resembling "engagement," that may also be described as a policy of "bringing China into international society."

2. East Asian Security and Japan-US-China

What exactly are the relevant points of contention in the security realm among Japan, the US and China in post-cold war Asia? Considering recent political and security problems, North Korea, the Revised Guidelines, TMD, as well as Taiwan first come to mind. Next, I will explore in turn the specifics of each of these.

1) The Revised Guidelines and TMD

Updated "Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation" (Revised Guidelines) were crafted in line with the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, agreed upon at talks between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton in April 1996. During the cold war US-Japan Security Treaty was consciously applied against the Soviet Union, but after the cold war, such a meaning clearly became diluted. Meanwhile, after the cold war regional conflicts erupted across the globe and the future shape of the Asia-Pacific region remains as uncertain as ever. Also, the intense friction of the 1980's between the US and Japan, primarily in economics, persisted as a distinct memory, leading to calls in various forums throughout the 1990's for a necessary strengthening of US-Japan relations. As a result, Japan and the US chose to bolster the security treaty, specifically by revising the Guidelines. The US-Japan Joint Security Declaration, derived from these various factors, followed closely behind the March 1996 Taiwan Presidential election and associated tensions due to China's missile exercises near the strait. This timing permits some to oversimplify the situation and interpret the act as a measure against China.

Laws implementing the Revised Guidelines passed the Diet this past May. Despite some differences, the Jiminto(LDP), Jiyuto(Liberal Party), Komeito(Clean Government Party), and Minshuto?Democratic Party? each basically approved the legislation, while the Socialist and Communist parties stood opposed.(4) Such extensive support implies public opinion basically accepted the guidelines. The Revised Guidelines further clarify and strengthen existing systems of cooperation for Japanese support to the US in an emergency. China warns severely that "These are significant measures by which militant elements in Japan will strengthen cooperation with the US military, and Japan will expand its military role in the Asia-Pacific region."(5) Due to the timing, just after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO troops, China saw eastward expansion of NATO and the Revised Guidelines as both linked to America's "strategy of global dominance." (6)

But the Chinese description of a Japan heading to become a "military superpower" is premature. Various domestic brakes exist, not least being constitutional limitations. Therefore, fundamental strict limits on the actions Japan's forces can take for rear area support and supplemental assistance to the United States apply even in a war or emergency; Japan in no way will be engaged in direct military action on the front lines. Really, seen from the opposite perspective, the legislation could be viewed as regulations that ensure continued restrictions on Japan. In this sense, Japan can be described as even more restrained than even Germany, which has directly participated in military action outside its borders by joining NATO's military.

China's real frustration stems from fears about the so-called situations in areas surrounding Japan (conditions that if not dealt with may lead to armed attack on Japan, or concerns nearby in the region that could severely impact on Japanese peace or security).(7) The Japanese government interprets this concept as "situational" vice "geographic." China fears this applies to Taiwan and continues to demand Japan delineate that "neighboring areas" exclude Taiwan. To date, Japanese officials are not yielding to these Chinese demands.

I suggest that in the unexpected case of Taiwan suddenly declaring independence, leading a determined China to turn to force, irrespective of what action America takes, an official Japanese declaration of a "situation in area surrounding Japan" will be somewhat difficult. Alternatively, should China suddenly use force against Taiwan without provocation, then a possibility arises that Japan will initiate acts consistent with those approved for "situations in area surrounding Japan," and corresponding to actions taken by the United States. Japan use of the "nature of the situation" rather than specifying a fixed geographic area stems from this kind of logic.

Japan's increasingly proactive involvement to participate in theater missile defense (TMD) stems from its reaction to North Korea's August 31 1998 test launch of the Taepo Dong missile. Already, joint US-Japan research is underway. China's strongly objects that TMD somehow conceives of China as the target, or may be diverted for the defense of Taiwan. Actually, TMD itself fits into America's global defense concept. Even in the US, commentators and experts exchange arguments for and against the concept, including disputes over the viability of the technology. Public debate on TMD in Japan, however, can not be described as sophisticated or sufficiently developed. As it stands, with the lack of transparency as to the situation in North Korea and "exclusive defense" nature of Japanese strategy, moves to continue forward with TMD will dominate.

Conceptually, TMD does not fix China as its target. But China proclaims a new arms race will start in Asia triggered by TMD. Should TMD development continue to advance, then it must do so in parallel with trilateral confidence-building measures (CBM's) incorporating China. Above all, a concomitant effort must be exerted to find a way to halt the very North Korea's missile development that causes concern.

TMD development will consume enormous resources, a problem under Japan's current financial difficulties. In its origin, TMD was meant as a type of insurance; by having it, its use becomes unnecessary, achieving the system's goal. But opinions differ as to whether this is a "waste of resources" or a "profitable investment." The key point then, as I will discuss later, lies in the primacy of normalizing diplomatic relations, while TMD exists merely as a supplemental measure designed to reduce exposure to risk should diplomatic negotiations fail.

2) The Taiwan Problem

Over the past years, China particularly Jiang Zeming has considered an early resolution to the Taiwan problem as against its own interests. Once again China appeared to be groping towards the path of dialogue that had been blocked ever since Lee's visit to America and the fallout from military exercises conducted by China off of Taiwan on the occasion of the island's 1996 presidential election. China employs various methods to lure Taiwan to the table for dialogue, relying on indirect assistance from America to this end through the 1997-1998 improved Sino-US ties. In one such success, China elicited from a visiting President Clinton the "Three No's" statement (no support for Taiwanese independence, no support for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and no support for the entry of Taiwan into any organizations for which sovereign nation status is a prerequisite). As such pressure from America, repeated at many levels in many forums, accumulates, Taiwan resolved to also reestablish direct discussions.(8)

But into 1999, Sino-US relations worsened over such issues as the conflict over Kosovo and accusations of nuclear spying. In such an environment, Lee Tenghui described relations between China and Taiwan as "a relationship between a special state and a state, and at this stage of the game, there is no need to declare independence."(9) China commenced strong attacks on him for what it took as substantially a "two state theory." Speculation ascribes Lee's motives to such things as staking his position to maintain his influence after retirement, or countering the effect of Clinton's "three no's." But it seems Lee's main motivation likely lay in his belief that if Taiwan enters into direct talks with China under the guise of the People’s Republic of China, such a formulation would allow it to meet China in a relationship of parity of a sort.(10)

In return, China asserted it would not meet Taiwan for talks until it withdrew the "two states theory." For a time, forceful calls for use of force came from the military, primarily from the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Wannian. The PLA's mouthpiece carried an article 11 September called "Why We Will Not Acquiesce and Renounce the Use of Weapons," a vitriolic editorial, which captured the atmosphere in the military. However, when the 21 September earthquake devastated Taiwan, Chairman Jiang Zemin called for the rhetoric to halt.(11) Meanwhile, Taiwanese public opinion polls showed "special two state theory" received support from the majority of residents. Hopeful presidential candidates Lien Chan (KMT) and Chen Shuibian (DPP) supported it, while even the other viable candidate, James Soong (expelled from the KMT in November 1999) then did not openly oppose it.

Ultimately both China and Taiwan became overexcited. The bottom line is that the previously adhered to course of "maintain the status quo" or "freeze the situation," held by common wisdom to be the best alternative for current relations had suddenly grown more complex because both sides have "face" at stake in the current stand off. The quickly approaching presidential election serves as a restraint, though. Recently China has avoided commenting on the controversy, adopting a "wait and see" approach, and even its position that it will only talk to Taiwan if it withdraws the "two state theory" has been subdued. The Taiwanese have been preoccupied with the election rather than concerns with the mainland. As such, the two have entered somewhat of a "cooling off period."

As for the substance of the Taiwan problem, China has consistently emphasized it constitutes a "domestic problem." Certainly this has some validity from the historical perspective. But viewed differently, the Taiwan problem already registers as an "international problem." The issue of Taiwan historically served as a point of contention between China and the United States, and as already described, is handled as essentially an "international problem" between China and America.

Current "international relations" are not necessarily limited to only nation-states as key players. NGO and other citizen groups, international organizations, multinational corporations and so forth join the ranks of major players in international relations in today's globalism. Many countries, including Japan, maintain relations with Taiwan in terms of people-to-people and economic ties and despite not having official diplomatic ties. For such countries, economic ties continue to expand and become increasingly complex, creating mutual interdependencies that can be hugely profitable. In light of such ties, the existence of a type of international relationship cannot be refuted. Accordingly, even while respecting China's position that Taiwan remains a "domestic issue," there coexists a sense in which the Taiwan also contains elements of an "international problem."

3) The Problem of North Korea

Japan, America, China, and South Korea are reaching a basically unified position on the problem of North Korea that calls for an end to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles, and seeks to promote policies of reform and opening. However, when it comes to specific implementation measures, the individual nations do not necessarily proceed in lockstep. The test launch of the Taepo Dong missile pointed this out clearly. Japan responded with a strong backlash and an announcement of sanction measures. Korea, perhaps because the Taepo Dong did not directly target its territory, did not seem overly concerned. America's anxiety appeared somewhere in between. As a result, the push for the development of TMD was energized in Japan, as already described. China expressed a negative view of missile development, but out of consideration for its ties with North Korea, took no further concrete actions.

The core of the regional system dealing with North Korea is the US-North Korea relationship. Since last fall, this relationship has exhibited a number of developments. In September, having secured from the US assurances it would soften sanctions against it, North Korea pledged to freeze missile test launches on the condition the two nations remain engaged in discussions. In October, Policy Coordinator Perry released his report on US policy options towards the North. The report endorsed the policy course of "comprehensive approach" as the means to best deal with the threat from North Korea, an effort that primarily relies on diplomatic negotiating tools.(12) In this changing environment, Japan also initiated measures towards talks and negotiations for normalization, spearheaded by Former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's nonpartisan delegation visit to North Korea. Japan's "stick and carrot" approach is consistent with the spirit of the Perry report, as Japan stipulates it will not abandon efforts to develop regional TMD against a potential North Korean threat even as it moves towards diplomatic negotiations.

While China acts as a key "friendly nation" for North Korea and provides vital assistance in basic commodities, it does not necessarily have the requisite leverage to propel the North towards policies of basic reform and opening. That said, we could safely assume that the two nations enjoy secret ties beyond the scenes, including links in the military sector. For this reason, China's response and behavior on the North Korea problem bears great significance for Japan, the US and Korea. As Japan and the US continue to work steadily in their direct negotiations for normalization with North Korea, China holds out the possibility, albeit minor, of serving as an intermediary to facilitate the political process.

Subtle differences shape the interests of Japan, China, the US, and Korea concerning reunification of the peninsula. Distracted with its own economic problems, Korea promotes the "Sunshine policy" and urges Japan and the US to normalize ties with the North, revealing a realistic approach to reunification as a long-term issue. An objective observer can see that ultimate reunification will undoubtedly occur under the leadership of South Korea. Indeed, reunification of the peninsula implies the possibility that the entire peninsula will necessitate occupation by some kind of transitory (American) administration or, what's more, the stationing of US troops up to the peninsula's common border with China. For this reason, China's true agenda may be considered maintenance of the status quo.(13) Both the US and Japan certainly fear chaos accompanying reunification, but consider an even more severe problem to be the continuance of a closed political system, possibly nuclear armed. For this reason, both nations ultimately prefer reunification to the status quo, premised of course on South Korean leadership.

In its essence, the problem of North Korea is history repeating itself. Our current efforts do not necessarily strike at a resolution of the source of the problem, as China, Japan, the US and Korea employ approaches at times out of synch. The situation requires redoubled efforts for closer communication and more coordinated approaches.

3 Looking Ahead to Twenty-first Century Japan-US-China Relations

1) Debate concerning Japan-US-China Relations

Due to the complex and important points of dispute in the region discussed thus far, we see the requirement to construct a basis from which the three nations can develop smooth ties as they head into the twenty-first century. Japan-US-China trilateral ties are not even at a stage where they could easily move forward to a trilateral summit meeting. Their interests are intricately balanced in a complex set of links and cross-purposes, and the time is not yet ripe for the three nations to settle down to pursue talks on confidence building. Yet, on the civilian level, a number of forums for dialogue on politics, security or economics were attempted in recent years. Additionally, a sub-governmental level trilateral meeting affiliated with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese Foreign Ministry, and US State Department originated with a preparatory meeting in 1998 and formally started in January of 1999. These can be considered preliminaries for an eventual trilateral meeting among the governments that will move them into range of a trilateral summit of heads of state in the future.

Ideally, Japan-US-China relations would be such that if two of the three nations united, they did not do so in opposition to the remaining nation, or if the three acted in concert, they did not do so in terms of a shared enemy. But as twentieth century international relations showed, these sentiments, though beautiful sentiments, prove immensely difficult to realize.

China often enters debates with a related argument, claiming "While the US and Japan are allies, China lacks such a relationship with either the US or Japan. If we enter talks with the two, then undoubtedly they will team up and bash us. As a consequence, we must take the current trilateral relations that are in the form of an isosceles triangle and create an equilateral triangle."(14)

In this argument hides a critical trap. The US-Japan alliance derives from the US-Japan Security Treaty. Thus, transforming trilateral relations into an equilateral triangle implies downgrading the US-Japan alliance to the lower standards of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. This would sacrifice the strong alliance we have today, the product of many years. Demoting a relationship that has attained the high level of the US-Japan alliance would not prove easy. Nor would it be appropriate. The suitability of the alliance constitutes one of the conclusions reached by Japanese post-war diplomacy, and, in truth, the alliance continues to enjoy a high level of public support from the Japanese.

The crux of the problem lies not in the nature of US-Japan ties, but in the immature Sino-Japanese and Sino-US relations. By speaking of elevating both Sino-Japanese and Sino-US ties to embody the US-Japan relationship in spirit and actions, a discussion on making trilateral relations an equilateral triangle can finally have meaning.

In the event of trilateral talks, the concern that Japan and the US will necessarily conspire to attack China oversimplifies the situation. For instance, after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the European nations and the US, without exception, repeatedly levied all sorts of sanctions on China and criticized the government. At the G7 Summit, it was Japan that lobbied to persuade others to refrain from isolating China and Japan first restored economic aid to China. Also consider events concerning Chinese accession to WTO, when the US resisted Chinese entrance, but the Japanese government quickly formally approved Chinese accession in conjunction with Prime Minister Obuchi's July 1999 visit to China. Japan even had to absorb complaints from the US over this.(15) Moreover, the December 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting never reached agreement, in part because Japan did not give in to US demands on such issues as anti-dumping. Clearly then Japan does not necessarily always "conspire" with the US. We can expect these dynamics to recur in the future, particularly in the realm of economic security.

Nonetheless, China's complaint does contain some truth. Some in Japan complain of "Japan passing" in reaction to sudden progress in US-China relations. Some in America harbor an instinct to prevent scenarios that would permit Japan and China, acting in concert, to team up against the United States. Creating an organizing model that enables cooperative ties between the three countries will not be easy; it not only faces practical problems based on reality, but also historical and psychological constraints.

2) The Significance of Japan-US-China Relations

Why do we emphasize Japan-US-China relations? At this point I would like to re-examine this point.

First, in very real terms, Japan, the US and China hold the most importance in shaping the regional order. America's economy ranks first in the world; its voice and influence dominate both political and security issues. Japan follows only the US in the size of its economy, and serves as a key donor nation, maintaining an enormous economic influence in the Asian Pacific. China's economic strength is still developing, but China rates great power status by virtue of its vast territory and population of almost 1.3 billion people, not to mention its permanent Security Council seat at the United Nations, granting it veto authority. In sum, Japan, the US and China constitute the "responsible nations" that will drive the region's future to one direction or the other. It necessarily follows that their mutual relations will prove critical to the region.

Secondly, as seen from other nations within the region as well as other regions, the Japan-US-China trilateral as will as the component countries themselves possess idiosyncrasies and present a heterogeneous mix. The region faces constraints due to a gamut of "Japan issues," "US issues" and "China issues." Should these three countries forge cooperative ties, they would contribute to the confidence to the region. In this context, "Japan issues" refers mainly to problems over history, lack of political leadership and closed markets. "US issues" implies coercion by "American standards" and supremacy of its unrivaled military forces. "China issues" speaks to a lack of transparency in political decision-making and military affairs, inconsistent implementation of the market economy and inadequacies of the legal system. The goal of keeping these various problems from intruding on the region necessitates a framework for trilateral ties that acts as a system of checks and balances.

Third, the weakness of cross-regional and multinational regional forums within Asia Pacific lends significance to Japan-US-China trilateral ties. Compared to the more advanced examples in Europe, whether considering politics, security or economics, an overarching sense of regional solidarity suffers greatly. Diversity defines Asia-Pacific and the resultant weak sense of homogeneity hinders significant impetus toward considering multinational frameworks. In diversity lies strengths, but also weakness.

Of course this region claims forums such as ASEAN and its derivative ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as economic organizations that span the Asia Pacific like APEC. Also, a new framework recently came into being, "ASEAN Plus Japan, Korea and China." Still, these suffer considerable flaws in terms of the territory encompassed, span of the region, extent of institutionalization, degree of commitment and interest of the various players.

To move beyond existing forums, momentum toward multinational cooperative bodies that are more sophisticated in extent and import requires an accumulation of dialogues in a variety of settings and at a number of levels that explore beyond mere bilaterals. To such an end, the regional powers of Japan, the US and China should look ahead to the twenty-first century and actively pursue talks, dialogue, and exchanges of opinions at all levels, with all nations of the region and with other regions, to the exclusion of none. Such an effort would truly be significant.

Conclusion: The New Potential of Japan-China-Korea Ties

Aside from Japan-China-US relations, the multilateral system receiving attention lately is the Japan-China-Korea framework. Reportedly, this concept originated with Prime Minister Obuchi, who put out feelers informally during summit talks with China and with South Korea. Such a structure materialized at the end of last November during the ASEAN Plus Japan, China and Korea meeting convened in Manila. The trilateral meeting transpired under the pretext of dining together over breakfast, significant as the first ever trilateral summit attended by Japan (Prime Minister Obuchi), China (Premier Zhu Rongji) and Korea (President Kim Daejong). Kim Daejong receives the credit for bringing the meeting to fruition, as he used his good ties with both China and Japan to facilitate its realization.

Certainly convening such meetings requires careful consideration. Japan and Korea must take America into account; indeed, some type of liaison with America reportedly preceded the event. China, for its part, remains concerned above all with North Korea and likely experienced serious reservations before proceeding to meet with the leadership of Japan and South Korea. Also, Premier Zhu Rongji represented China in the meeting. Since Jiang Zemin holds pivotal responsibility for foreign relations, while Zhu basically bears responsibility only for economic policy, we can infer Chinese domestic considerations meant some misgivings about involving Jiang in the trilateral summit. Perhaps for the same reasons, China presents a considerably prudent posture concerning engaging Japan and Korea in discussions on security issues within a trilateral framework and concerning efforts to establish the Manila meeting as a precedent for further trilateral talks.

Overall, relations among the neighboring countries of Japan, China and Korea (referred to here in the broader sense of the whole peninsula) during the twentieth century displayed a regrettable lack of mature development. Certainly Japan bears the brunt of responsibility for events in the region the first part of the century. If Japanese duly reflect on this past, then we must seek to foster cooperative relations and confidence among Japan, China, and Korea. Clearly this effort should not take a shape that excludes other nations or regions, including America and North Korea. With that in mind, it is vital that an appropriate framework be conceived to secure peace and stability in the region.

Naturally this paper focused on Japan-China-US relations. But paying attention only to this primary trilateral relationship is insufficient. In addition, we should strive to envision alternate frameworks that complement China-Japan-US ties. A skilled player of the strategy game go (weiqi) knows how to work in spaces outside of the main area under contest, building up areas throughout the board in preparation for a final link up that leads to victory. Alternate frameworks such as a Japan-China-Korea forum should be understood as similarly strategically placed efforts for ultimately developing enduring multinational frameworks that encompass the entire region.

Notes:

1. For more on Japan-US-China trilateral relations, see Ryosei Kokubun, ed., Japan, US, and China: Scenarios toward Cooperation, TBS Britannica, 1997; Tatsumi Okabe, Seiichiro Takagi, Ryosei Kokubun, eds., Seeking Security Cooperation among Japan, US, and China, Keiso Shobo, 1991; Zhang Yunlin, Zhongbian zhongde Zhong, Mei, Ri guanxi (China-US-Japan Relationship in Change), Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1997); Ryosei Kokubun, ed., Challenges for China-Japan-U.S. Cooperation, Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), 1998; JCIE, ed., New Dimensions of China-Japan-U.S. Relations, JCIE, 1999.

2 Collected Readings and Materials on Sino-Japanese Relations 1949-1979, Kazankai, 1998, p. 413.

3 For more on particulars and complications concerning this matter, see Ryosei Kokubun's "Sino-Japanese Relations in a Trial Era: A Historical Record of Jiang Zemin's Visit to Japan," in Hogaku Kenkyu (Keio University), Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 2000).

4 For the policy stances of each party, see the 1999 Special Edition of Gaiko Forum titled Japanese Diplomacy at the Crossroads of the 21^st Century, Toshi Shuppansha, November 1999, pp. 166-173.

5 "Quanguo zhengxie waiweihui fuzeren fabiao tanhua (Spokesman's Statement of the National Consultative Conference, Foreign Affairs Committee) Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) , May 27, 1999.

6 "Run Meiguo baquan zhuyi de xinfazhan (On the New Development of the U.S. Hegemonism," Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), May 27, 1999.

7 "Shuhen jitai anzenhoshoho (Neighboring Situations Security Legislation)," Gaiko Forum, (same issue as listed above), p. 136.

8 My private interviews with Taiwanese policy authorities (November 1999).

9 Sankei Shimbun, July 14, 1999. Further, following on this, Lee published "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," in Foreign Affairs, November- December 1999.

10 My private interviews with Taiwanese policy authorities (November 1999).

11 My private interviews with Chinese policy authorities(October and December 1999).

12 Yomiuri Shimbun, October 16, 1999.

13 My private interviews with Chinese policy authorities (October and December 1999).

14 There are many articles concerning this. See for example, Yang Bojiang, "Qianghua Ri-mei tongmeng: Riben mianxiang 21 shiji de zhanlue qitiaoban? (Reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Is Japan facing the Strategic Step Board for the 21st Century?)" in Xiandai Guojiguanxi, No. 6, 1999; Jin Linpo, "Mei-ri tongmeng zaidingyide beijing, guocheng, jiqi yingxiang (The Background, Process and its Influence of Re-definition of US-Japan Alliance) in Guoji Wenti Yanqiu, No. 1, 1999.

15 My private Interviews with American policy authorities (July 1999).