Awaiting the second big data revolution
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Abstract

“Big data” has been heralded as the agent of a third industrial revolution—one with raw materials measured in bits, rather than tons of steel or barrels of oil. Yet the industrial revolution transformed not just how firms made things, but the fundamental approach to value creation in industrial economies. To date, big data has not achieved this distinction. Instead, today’s successful big data business models largely use data to scale old modes of value creation, rather than invent new ones altogether. Moreover, today’s big data cannot deliver the promised revolution. In this way, today’s big data landscape resembles the early phases of the first industrial revolution, rather than the culmination of the second a century later. Realizing the second big data revolution will require fundamentally different kinds of data, different innovations, and different business models than those seen to date. That fact has profound consequences for the kinds of investments and innovations firms must seek, and the economic, political, and social consequences that those innovations portend.

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1 Introduction

We believe that we live in an era of “big data”. Firms today accumulate, often nearly by accident, vast quantities of data about their customers, suppliers, and the world at large. Technology firms like Google or Facebook have led the pack in finding uses for such data, but its imprint is visible throughout the economy. The expanding sources and uses of data suggest to many the dawn of a new industrial revolution. Those who cheer lead for this revolution proclaim that these changes, over time, will rival the industrial revolution in scope and consequences for economic and social prosperity.

Yet this “big data” revolution has so far fallen short of its promise. Precious few firms transmutate data into novel products. Instead, most rely on data to operate, at unprecedented scale, business models with long pedigree in the media and retail sectors. Big data, despite protests to the contrary, is thus an incremental change—and its revolution one of degree, not kind.

The reasons for these shortcomings point to the challenges we face in realizing the promise of the big data revolution. Today’s advances in search, e-commerce, and social media relied on the creative application of marginal improvements in processing power and storage. In contrast, tomorrow’s hopes for transforming real-world outcomes in areas like health care, education, energy, and other complex phenomena pose scientific and engineering challenges of an entirely different scale.

2 The implausibility of big data

Our present enthusiasm for big data stems from the confusion of data and knowledge. Firms today can gather more data, at lower cost, about a wider variety of subjects, than ever before. Big data’s advocates claim that this data will become the raw material of a new industrial revolution that will alter how we govern, work, play, and live. These raw materials are so cheap and abundant that, we are told, the horizon is bounded only by the supply of smart people capable of molding these materials into the next generation of innovations [Manyika et al., 2011].

This utopia of data is badly flawed. Those who promote it rely on a series of bad assumptions about the origins and uses of data, none of which hold up to serious scrutiny. Taken together, those mistakes point out the limits of a revolution built on the raw materials that today seem so abundant.
Four of these assumptions need special attention: First, \( N = \text{all} \), or the claim that our data allow a clear and unbiased study of humanity; second, that today equals tomorrow, or the claim that understanding online behavior today implies that we will still understand it tomorrow; third, that understanding online behavior offers a window into offline behavior; and fourth, that complex patterns of social behavior, once understood, will remain stable enough to become the basis of new data-driven, predictive products and services. Each of these has its issues. Taken together, those issues limit the future of a revolution that relies, as today’s does, on the “digital exhaust” of social networks, e-commerce, and other online services. The true revolution must lie elsewhere.

2.1 \( N = \text{all} \)

Gathering data via traditional methods has always been difficult. Small samples were unreliable; large samples were expensive; samples might not be representative, despite researchers’ best efforts; monitoring the same sample over many years posed all sorts of difficulties. None of this, moreover, was very scalable: researchers needed a new sample for every question, or had to divine in advance a battery of questions. No wonder social research proceeded so slowly.

Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013) argue that big data will eliminate these problems. Instead of having to rely on samples, online data allows us to measure the universe of online behavior, where \( N \) (the number of people in the sample) is basically \( \text{All} \) (the entire population of people we care about). Hence we no longer need worry, they claim, about the problems that have plagued researchers in the past. When \( N = \text{all} \), large samples are cheap and representative, new data on individuals arrives constantly, monitoring data over time poses no added difficulty, and cheap storage permits us to ask new questions of the same data again and again.

But \( N \neq \text{All} \). Most of the data that dazzles those infatuated by “big data” comes from what McKinsey & Company termed “digital exhaust” (Manyika et al., 2011): the web server logs, e-commerce purchasing histories, social media relations, and other data thrown off by systems in the course of serving web pages, online shopping, or person-to-person communication. The \( N \) covered by that data concerns only those who use these services—not society at large.

Hence the uses of that data are limited. It’s very relevant for understand-
ing web search behavior, purchasing, or how people behave on social media. But the N here is skewed in ways both known and unknown–perhaps younger than average, or more tech-savvy, or wealthier than the general population. That we have enormous quantities of data about these people says nothing about whether that data tells us anything about society.

2.2 All (today) = All (tomorrow)

But let’s say that we truly believe this assumption–that everyone is (or soon will be) online. Surely the proliferation of smart phones and other devices is bringing that world closer, at least in the developed world. This brings up the second assumption–that we know where to go find all these people. Several years ago, MySpace was the leading social media website, a treasure trove of new data on social relations. Today, it’s the punchline to a joke. The rate of change in online commerce, social media, search, and other services undermines any claim that we can actually know that our \( N = \text{all} \) sample that works today will work tomorrow. Instead, we only know about new developments–and the data and populations they cover–well after they have already become big. Hence our \( N = \text{all} \) sample is persistently biased in favor of the old.

2.3 Online behavior = offline behavior

But let’s again assume that problem away. Let’s assume that we have all the data, about all the people, for all the online behavior, gathered from the digital exhaust of all the relevant products and services out there. Perhaps, in this context, we can make progress understanding human behavior online. But that is not the revolution that big data has promised. Most of the ”big data” hype has ambitions beyond improving web search, online shopping, socializing, or other online activity. Instead, big data should help cure disease, detect epidemics, monitor physical infrastructure, and aid first responders in emergencies.

To satisfy these goals, we need a new assumption: that what people do online mirrors what they do offline. Otherwise, all the digital exhaust in the world won’t describe the actual problems we care about.

There’s little reason to think that offline life faithfully mirrors online behavior. Research has consistently shown that individuals’ online identities vary widely from their offline selves. In some cases, that means people are
more cautious about revealing their true selves. danah boyd’s work (boyd and Marwick, 2011) has shown that teenagers cultivate online identities very different from their offline selves—whether for creative, privacy, or other reasons. In others, it may mean that people are more vitriolic, or take more extreme positions. Online political discussions—another favorite subject of big data enthusiasts—suffers from levels of vitriol and partisanship far beyond anything seen offline (Conover et al., 2011). Of course, online and offline identity aren’t entirely separate. That would invite suggestions of schizophrenia among internet users. But the problem remains—we don’t know what part of a person is faithfully represented online, and what part is not.

2.4 Behavior of all (today) = Behavior of all (tomorrow)

OK, but you say, surely we can determine how these distortions work, and incorporate them into our models? After all, doesn’t statistics have a long history of trying to gain insight from messy, biased, or otherwise incomplete data?

Perhaps we could build such a map, one that allows us to connect the observed behaviors of a skewed and selective online population to offline developments writ large. This suffices only if we care primarily about describing the past. But much of the promise of big data comes from predicting the future—where and when people will get sick in an epidemic, which bridges might need the most attention next month, whether today’s disgruntled high schooler will become tomorrow’s mass shooter.

Satisfying these predictive goals requires yet another assumption. It is not enough to have all the data, about all the people, and a map that connects that data to real-world behaviors and outcomes. We also have to assume that the map we have today will still describe the world we want to predict tomorrow.

Two obvious and unknowable sources of change stand in our way. First, people change. Online behavior is a culmination of culture, language, social norms and other factors that shape both people and how they express their identity. These factors are in constant flux. The controversies and issues of yesterday are not those of tomorrow; the language we used to discuss anger, love, hatred, or envy change. The pathologies that afflict humanity may endure, but the ways we express them do not.
Second, technological systems change. The data we observe in the "digital exhaust" of the internet is created by individuals acting in the context of systems with rules of their own. Those rules are set, intentionally or not, by the designers and programmers that decide what we can and cannot do with them. And those rules are in constant flux. What we can and cannot buy, who we can and cannot contact on Facebook, what photos we can or cannot see on Flickr vary, often unpredictably. Facebook alone is rumored to run up to a thousand different variants on its site at one time. Hence even if culture never changed, our map from online to offline behavior would still decay as the rules of online systems continued to evolve.

Compounding this problem, we cannot know, in advance, which of these social and technological changes will matter to our map. That only becomes apparent in the aftermath, as real-world outcomes diverge from predictions cast using the exhaust of online systems.

Lest this come off as statistical nihilism, consider the differences in two papers that both purport to use big data to project the outcome of US elections. DiGrazia et al. (2013) claim that merely counting the tweets that reference a Congressional candidate—with no adjustments for demography, or spam, or even name confusion—can provide insight on whether that candidate will win his or her election. This is a purely “digital exhaust” approach. As Huberty (2013a) shows, that approach adds no predictive value above and beyond just guessing that the incumbent party would win—a simple and powerful predictor of success in American elections. Big data provided little value.

Contrast this with Wang et al. (2014). They use the Xbox gaming platform as a polling instrument, which they hope might help compensate for the rising non-response rates that have plagued traditional telephone polls. As with Twitter, $N \neq All$: the Xbox user community is younger, more male, less politically involved. But the paper nevertheless succeeds in generating accurate estimates of general electoral sentiment. The key difference lies in their use of demographic data to re-weight respondents’ electoral sentiments to look like the electorate at large. The Xbox data were no less skewed than Twitter data; but the process of data collection provided the means to compensate. The black box of Twitter’s digital exhaust, lacking this data, did not.
2.5 The implausibility of Big Data 1.0

Taken together, the assumptions that we have to make to fulfill the promise of today’s big data hype appear wildly implausible. To recap, we must assume that:

1. Everyone we care about is online
2. We know where to find them today, and tomorrow
3. They represent themselves online consistent with how they behave offline
4. They will continue to represent themselves online—in behavior, language, and other factors—in the same way, for long periods of time

Nothing in the history of the internet suggests that even one of these statements holds true. Everyone was not online in the past; and likely will not be online in the future. The constant, often wrenching changes in the speed, diversity, and capacity of online services means those who are online move around constantly. They do not, as we’ve seen, behave in ways necessarily consistent with their offline selves. And the choices they make about how to behave online evolve in unpredictable ways.

But if each of these statements fall down, then how have companies like Amazon, Facebook, or Google built such successful business models? The answer lies in two parts. First, most of what these companies do is self-referential: they use data about how people search, shop, or socialize online to improve and expand services targeted at searching, shopping, or socializing. Google by definition, has an $N = \text{all}$ sample of Google users’ online search behavior. Amazon knows the shopping behaviors of Amazon users. Of course, that population is subject to change its behaviors, its self-representation, or its expectations at any point. But at least Google can plausibly claim to have a valid sample of the primary population it cares about.

Second, the consequences of failure are, on the margins, very low. Google relies heavily on predictive models of user behavior to sell the advertising that accounts for most of its revenue. But the consequences of errors in that model are low—Google suffers little from serving the wrong ad on the margins. Of course, persistent and critical errors of understanding will undermine products and lead to lost customers. But there’s usually plenty of time to correct course before that happens.
But if we move even a little beyond these low-risk, self-referential systems, the usefulness of the data that underpin them quickly erodes. Google Flu provides a valuable lesson in this regard. In 2008, Google announced a new collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to track and report rates of influenza infection. Historically, the CDC had monitored US flu infection patterns through a network of doctors that tracked and reported “influenza-like illness” in their clinics and hospitals. But doctors’ reports took up to two weeks to reach the CDC—a long time in a world confronting SARS or avian flu. Developing countries with weaker public health capabilities faced even greater challenges. Google hypothesized that, when individuals or their family members got the flu, they went looking on the internet—via Google, of course—for medical advice. In a highly cited paper, Ginsberg et al. (2008) showed that they could predict region-specific influenza infection rates in the United States using Google search frequency data. Here was the true promise of big data—that we capitalize on virtual data to better understand the physical world around us.

The subsequent history of Google Flu illustrates the shortcomings of the first big data revolution. Google Flu has failed twice since its launch. The patterns and reasons for failure speak to the limits of prediction. In 2009, Google Flu under-predicted flu rates during the H1N1 pandemic. Post-mortem analysis suggested that the different viral characteristics of H1N1 compared with garden-variety strains of influenza likely meant that individuals didn’t know they had a flu strain, and thus didn’t go looking for flu-related information (Cook et al., 2011). Conversely, in 2012, Google Flu over-predicted influenza infections. Google has yet to discuss why, but speculation has centered on the intensive media coverage of an early-onset flu season, which may have sparked interest in the flu among healthy individuals (Butler, 2013).

The problems experienced by Google Flu provide a particularly acute warning of the risks inherent in trying to predict what will happen in the real world based on the exhaust of the digital one. Google Flu relied on a map—a mathematical relationship between online behavior and real-world infection. Google built that map on historic patterns of flu infection and search. It assumed that such patterns would continue to hold in the future. But there was nothing fundamental about those patterns. Either a change in the physical world—a new virus—or the virtual one—media coverage—were enough to render the map inaccurate. The CDC’s old reporting networks out-performed big data when it mattered most.
3 A revolution constrained: data, potential, and value creation

Despite ostensibly free raw materials, mass-manufacturing insight from digital exhaust has thus proven far more difficult than big data’s advocates would let on. It’s thus unsurprising that this revolution has had similarly underwhelming effects on business models. Amazon, Facebook, and Google are enormously successful businesses, underpinned by technologies operating at unprecedented scale. But they still rely on centuries-old business models for most of their revenue. Google and Amazon differ in degree, but not kind, from a newspaper or a large department store when it comes to making money. This is a weak showing from a revolution that was supposed to change the 21st century in the way that steam, steel, or rail changed the 19th. Big data has so far made it easier to sell things, target ads, or stalk long-lost friends or lovers. But it hasn’t yet fundamentally reworked patterns of economic life, generated entirely new occupations, or radically altered relationships with the physical world. Instead, it remains oddly self-referential: we generate massive amounts of data in the process of online buying, viewing, or socializing; but find that data truly useful only for improving online sales and search.

Understanding how we might get from here to there requires a better understanding of how and why data—big or small—might create value in a world of better algorithms and cheap compute capacity. Close examination shows that firms have largely used big data to improve on existing business models, rather than adopt new ones; and that those improvements have relied on data to describe and predict activity in worlds largely of their own making. Where firms have ventured beyond these self-constructed virtual worlds, the data have proven far less useful, and products built atop data far more prone to failure.

3.1 Locating the value in data

The Google Flu example suggests the limits to big data as a source of mass-manufactured insight about the real world. But Google itself, and its fellow big-data success stories, also illustrate the shortcomings of big data as a source of fundamentally new forms of value creation. Most headline big data business models have used their enhanced capacity to describe, predict,
or infer in order to implement—albeit at impressive scale and complexity—centuries-old business models. Those models create value not from the direct exchange between consumer and producer, but via a web of transactions several orders removed from the creation of the data itself. Categorizing today’s big data business models based on just how far they separate data generation from value creation quickly illustrates how isolated the monetary value of firms’ data is from their primary customers. Having promised a first-order world, big data has delivered a third-order reality.

Realizing the promise of the big data revolution will require a different approach. The same problems that greeted flu prediction have plagued other attempts to build big data applications that forecast the real world. Engineering solutions to these problems that draw on the potential of cheap computation and powerful algorithms will require not different methods, but different raw materials. The data those materials require must originate from a first-order approach to studying and understanding the worlds we want to improve. Such approaches will require very different models of firm organization than those exploited by Google and its competitors in the first big data revolution.

3.1.1 Third-order value creation: the newspaper model

Most headline big data business models do not make much money directly from their customers. Instead, they rely on third parties—mostly advertisers—to generate profits from data. The actual creation and processing of data is only useful insofar as it’s of use to those third parties. In doing so, these models have merely implemented, at impressive scale and complexity, the very old business model used by the newspapers they have largely replaced.

If we reach back into the dim past when newspapers were viable businesses (rather than hobbies of the civic-minded rich), we will remember that their business model had three major components:

1. Gather, filter, and analyze news
2. Attract readers by providing that news at far below cost
3. Profit by selling access to those readers to advertisers

The market for access matured along with the newspapers that provided it. Both newspapers and advertisers realized that people who read the business pages differed from those who read the front page, or the style section.
Front-page ads were more visible to readers than those buried on page A6. Newspapers soon started pricing access to their readers accordingly. Bankers paid one price to advertise in the business section, clothing designers another for the style pages. This segmentation of the ad market evolved as the ad buyers and sellers learned more about whose eyeballs were worth how much, when, and where.

Newspapers were thus third-order models. The news services they provided were valuable in their own right. But readers didn’t pay for them. Instead, news was a means of generating attention and data, which was only valuable when sold to third parties in the form of ad space. Data didn’t directly contribute to improving the headline product—news—except insofar as it generated revenue that could be plowed back into news gathering. The existence of a tabloid press of dubious quality but healthy revenues proved the weakness of the link between good journalism and profit.

From a value creation perspective, Google, Yahoo, and other ad-driven big data businesses are nothing more than newspapers at scale. They too provide useful services (then news, now email or search) to users at rates far below cost. They too profit by selling access to those users to third-party advertisers. They too accumulate and use data to carve up the ad market. The scale of data they have available, of course, dwarfs that of their newsprint ancestors. This data, combined with cheap computation and powerful statistics, has enabled operational efficiency, scale, and effectiveness far beyond what newspapers could ever have managed. But the business model itself—the actual means by which these firms earn revenues—is identical.

### 3.1.2 Second-order value creation: the retail model

Big-box retail ranks as the other substantial success for big data. Large retailers like Amazon, Wal-Mart, or Target have very effectively used data to optimize their supply chain, identify trends and logistical issues ahead of time, and maximize the likelihood of both initial sales and return business from their customers.

Big data may enable them to operate more efficiently. But that efficiency is in service of a model of value generation—retail—that has existed for a very long time. As with Google and ads, big data has enabled these retailers to attain scale and complexity heretofore unimaginable. In doing so, at least some of their profitability has come from market power over suppliers, who lack the access and data the retailers command. But the fundamental means
by which they create value is no different than it was fifty years ago.

Retailers are thus second-order big data models. Unlike third-order models, the data they gather has a lot of direct value to the retailer. They don’t need to rely on third party purchasers to give the data value. But the actual moneymaking transaction—the retail sale of goods and services—remains separated from the uses of data to improve operational efficiency.

### 3.1.3 First-order value creation: the opportunity

Second- and third-order models find value in data several steps removed from the actual transaction that generates the data. But, as the Google Flu example illustrated, that data may have far less value when separated from its virtual context. Thus while these businesses enjoy effectively free raw materials, the potential uses of those materials are in fact quite limited. Digital exhaust from web browsing, shopping, or socializing has proven enormously useful in the self-referential task of improving future web browsing, shopping, and socializing. But that success has not translated success at tasks far removed from the virtual world that generated this exhaust. Digital exhaust may be plentiful and convenient to collect, but it offers limited support for understanding or responding to real-world problems.

First-order models, in contrast, escape the Flu trap by building atop purpose-specific data, conceived and collected with the intent of solving specific problems. In doing so, they capitalize on the cheap storage, powerful algorithms, and inexpensive compute power that made the first wave of big data firms possible. But they do so in pursuit of a rather different class of problems.

First order products remain in their infancy. But some nascent examples suggest what might be possible. IBM’s Watson famously used its natural language and pattern recognition abilities to win Jeopardy!. But now IBM has adapted Watson to medical diagnosis. By learning from disease and health data gathered from millions of patients, Watson can improve the quality, accuracy, and efficacy of medical diagnosis and service to future patients.\(^1\) Watson closes the data value loop: patient data is made valuable because it improves patient services, not because it helps with insurance underwriting or product manufacturing or logistics or some other third-party service.

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\(^1\)See [Steadman (2013)](#) for early results of experiments showing that Watson can improve the accuracy of cancer diagnoses.
Premise Corporation provides another example. Premise has built a mobile-phone based data gathering network to measure macroeconomic aggregates like inflation and food scarcity. This network allows them to monitor economic change at a very detailed level, in regions of the world where official statistics are unavailable or unreliable. This sensor network is the foundation of the products and services that Premise sells to financial services firms, development agencies, and other clients. As compared with the attenuated link between data and value in second- or third-order businesses, Premise’s business model links the design of the data generation process directly to the value of its final products.

Optimum Energy (OE) provides a final example. OE monitors and aggregates data on building energy use–principally data centers–across building types, environments, and locations. That data enables it to build models for building energy use and efficiency optimization. Those models, by learning building behaviors across many different kinds of inputs and buildings, can perform better than single-building models with limited scope. Most importantly, OE creates value for clients by using this data to optimize energy efficiency and reduce energy costs.

These first-order business models all rely on data specifically obtained for their products This reliance on purpose-specific data contrasts with third-order models that rely on the “digital exhaust” of conventional big data wisdom. To use the newspaper example, third-order models assume–but can’t specifically verify–that those who read the style section are interested in purchasing new fashions. Google’s success stemmed from closing this information gap a bit–showing that people who viewed web pages on fashion were likely to click on fashion ads. But again, the data that supports this is data generated by processes unrelated to actual purchasing–activities like web surfing and search or email exchange. And so the gap remains.

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2See [http://premise.is/](http://premise.is/).


4Google appears to realize this, and has launched Consumer Surveys as an attempt to bridge that gap. In brief, it offers people the chance to skip adds in favor of providing brand feedback. See [https://www.google.com/insights/consumersurveys/home](https://www.google.com/insights/consumersurveys/home) for more detail.
3.2 The unrealized promise of unreasonable data

We should remember the root of the claim about big data. That claim was perhaps best summarized by Halevy et al. (2009) in what they termed “the unreasonable effectiveness of data”. Most appear to have taken that to mean that data—and particularly more data—are unreasonably effective everywhere—and that, by extension, even noisy or skewed data could suffice to answer hard questions if we could simply get enough of it. But that mis-states the authors’ claims. They did not claim that more data was always better. Rather, they argued that, for specific kinds of applications, history suggested that gathering more data paid better dividends than inventing better algorithms. Where data are sparse, or the phenomenon under measurement noisy, more data allow a more complete picture of what we are interested in. Machine translation provides a very pertinent example: human speech and writing varies enormously within one language, let alone two. Faced with the choice between better algorithms for understanding human language, and more data to quantify the variance in language, more data appears to work better. But for other applications, the “bigness” of data may not matter at all. If I want to know who will win an election, polling a thousand people might be enough. Relying on the aggregated voices of a nation’s Twitter users, in contrast, will probably fail (Gayo-Avello et al., 2011; Gayo-Avello, 2012; Huberty, 2013b). Not only are we not, as section 2 discussed, in the \( N = \text{All} \) world that infatuated Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013); but for most problems we likely don’t care to be. Having the right data—and consequently identifying the right question to ask beforehand—is far more important than having a lot of data of limited relevance to the answers we seek.

4 Consequences

Big data therefore falls short of proclamation that it represents the biggest change in technological and economic possibility since the industrial revolution. That revolution, in the span of a century or so, fundamentally transformed almost every facet of human life. Having ranked big data with the industrial revolution, we find ourselves wondering why our present progress

\footnote{Not everyone is convinced. Peter Norvig, head of research at Google, had a very public dispute with the linguist Noam Chomsky over whether progress in machine translation contributed anything at all to our understanding of human language. See \url{http://norvig.com/chomsky.html} for Norvig’s account of this dispute and a link to Chomsky's position.}
seems so paltry in comparison. But much of what we associate with the industrial revolution—the advances in automobile transport, chemistry, communication, and medicine—came much later. The businesses that produced them were fundamentally different from the small collections of tinkerers and craftsmen that built the first power looms. Instead, these firms invested in huge industrial research and development operations to discover and then commercialize new scientific discoveries. These changes were expensive, complicated, and slow—so slow that John Stuart Mill despaired, as late as 1871, of human progress. But in time, they produced a world inconceivable to even the enthusiasts of the 1840s.

In today’s revolution, we have our looms, but we envision the possibility of a Model T. Today, we can see glimmers of that possibility in IBM’s Watson, Google’s self-driving car, or Nest’s thermostats that learn the climate preferences of a home’s occupants. These and other technologies are deeply embedded in, and reliant on, data generated from and around real-world phenomena. None rely on “digital exhaust”. They do not create value by parsing customer data or optimizing ad click-through rates (though presumably they could). They are not the product of a relatively few, straightforward (if ultimately quite useful) insights. Instead, IBM, Google, and Nest have dedicated substantial resources to studying natural language processing, large-scale machine learning, knowledge extraction, and other problems. The resulting products represent an industrial synthesis of a series of complex innovations, linking machine intelligence, real-time sensing, and industrial design. These products are thus much closer to what big data’s proponents have promised—but their methods are a world away from the easy hype about mass-manufactured insights from the free raw material of digital exhaust.

5 Awaiting the second big data revolution

We’re stuck in the first industrial revolution. We have the power looms and the water mills, but wonder, given all the hype, at the absence of the Model Ts and telephones of our dreams. The answer is a hard one. The big gains from big data will require a transformation of organizational, technological, and economic operations on par with that of the second industrial revolution. Then, as now, firms had to invest heavily in industrial research and development to build the foundations of entirely new forms of value creation.

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6 Nest has since been acquired by Google.
Those foundations permitted entirely new business models, in contrast to the marginal changes of the first industrial revolution. And the raw materials of the first revolution proved only tangentially useful to the innovations of the second.

These differences portend a revolution of greater consequence and complexity. Firms will likely be larger. Innovation will rely less on small entrepreneurs, who lack the funds and scale for systems-level innovation. Where entrepreneurs do remain, they will play far more niche roles. As Rao (2012) has argued, startups will increasingly become outsourced R&D, whose innovations are acquired to become features of existing products rather than standalone products themselves. The success of systems-level innovation will threaten a range of current jobs—white collar and service sector as well as blue collar and manufacturing—as expanding algorithmic capacity widens the scope of digitizeable tasks. But unlike past revolutions, that expanding capacity also begs the question of where this revolution will find new forms of employment insulated from these technological forces; and if it does not, how we manage the social instability that will surely follow. With luck, we will resist the temptation to use those same algorithmic tools for social control. But human history on that point is not encouraging.

Regardless, we should resist the temptation to assume that a world of ubiquitous data means a world of cheap, abundant, and relevant raw materials for a new epoch of economic prosperity. The most abundant of those materials today turn out to have limited uses outside the narrow products and services that generate them. Overcoming that hurdle requires more than just smarter statisticians, better algorithms, or faster computation. Instead, it will require new business models capable of nurturing both new sources of data and new technologies into truly new products and services.

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